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Recent empirical studies find that foreign direct investment (FDI) by a multinational firm is 
not associated with a reduction of the firm’s domestic activities. As it is often argued, this 
finding may imply that a country should not tax the firm’s foreign profit income since this 
reduces foreign investment without benefitting the domestic economy. The paper analyzes 
this argument using a model with heterogeneous multinational firms which serve a foreign 
market through exports or FDI. If a firm switches from exporting to FDI, domestic activity 
and tax payments may decrease, stay constant or even rise due to intra-firm trade. It turns out 
that, in all three cases, the optimal tax system implies full taxation after deduction of foreign 
tax payments. If the country accounts for the effects of its policy on the foreign price level, 
the case for taxing foreign income becomes even stronger. From a global point of view, the 
nationally optimal tax rate on repatriated foreign profits is inefficiently high. In contrast to the 
standard literature, the globally optimal tax system requires a lower tax rate than under the tax 
credit system which, under certain circumstances, may imply exempting foreign income from 
tax. 
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In 2008, the worldwide income from outward foreign direct investment reached
an all-time high of US$ 1,283 billion, of which the United States alone had US$
350 billion and the United Kingdom around US$ 130 billion.1 This income is
generally taxed at source, i.e. in the country where the investment has been made.
However, when transferred back to the ￿rm￿ s headquarter, it can additionally be
taxed by the country where the headquarter of the multinational ￿rm resides.
In this case, the OECD recommends choosing among two standard systems of
taxing repatriated business income: the tax credit system where foreign income is
taxed at the domestic corporate tax rate and foreign taxes are credited against the
domestic tax liability, and the exemption system where foreign income is exempt
from domestic taxation. Given the scarcity of public funds, one would expect
that governments in residence countries around the world grasp this opportunity
and exercise their right to tax. However, the opposite can be observed: Several
countries including the United Kingdom2 and the United States3 have recently
switched from the tax credit system to exemption or are considering such a move.
These reform initiatives receive intellectual support from the academic realm
which may seem surprising because, for a long time, scholars used to favor the
tax credit system for e¢ ency reasons. However, as proponents of the exemption
system argue, empirical ￿ndings have altered the view on international capital
￿ ows and, thus, the foundation for optimal taxation reasoning. According to
these authors, the new view on multinational investment implies the optimality of
the tax exemption system. For instance, Mihir Desai (2009) states that ￿modern
welfare norms that capture the nature of multinational ￿rm activity recommend a
move toward not taxing the foreign activities of American ￿rms, rather than taxing
them more heavily￿ . In this paper, I examine whether the case for switching to an
exemption system is theoretically well-founded.
The superiority of the credit system builds on the classical work by Peggy Mus-
grave (nØe Richman, 1963) who describes a world in which a multinational ￿rm al-
1See www.unctad.org (World Investment Report), www.bea.gov and www.statistics.gov.uk
(number for UK from 2007: GBP 89,855 (exchange rate from 31/12/2008).
2See e.g. HM Treasury and HM Revenue and Customs, 2007.
3See e.g. United States Department of the Treasury, O¢ ce of Tax Policy, 2007.
1locates its investment projects across locations. At the margin, it chooses between
investing the last dollar at home or abroad. In such a situation, full taxation of
foreign income after deduction of foreign taxes paid is the optimal tax policy from
a national point of view, whereas crediting foreign taxes against domestic taxes
leads to global optimality. Musgrave￿ s work (Richman, 1963, Musgrave, 1969) and
the following contributions like Hamada (1966) and Feldstein & Hartman (1979)
were highly in￿ uential in shaping international taxation agreements like e.g. the
OECD convention on double taxation treaties.4
This view has recently been challenged. The main point of criticism focusses
on the multinational￿ s investment behaviour. In the Musgrave model, one dollar
of investment abroad crowds out one dollar of investment at home. Proponents of
the new view on international taxation argue that this has been proven wrong by
empirical evidence.5 Instead, a dollar invested abroad can be shown to e⁄ectively
increase domestic investment within the ￿rm or, at least, to leave it una⁄ected.6
Then, the proponents argue, there is no rationale anymore for taxing foreign in-
come for e¢ ciency reasons. Optimality implies exemption of foreign pro￿ts.
In the following, I will restate the proponents￿arguments in a formal model
which captures the important features of the ￿nature of multinational ￿rm activ-
ity￿ : imperfect competition, ￿rm-speci￿c advantages and heterogeneous consumer
tastes. Firms may choose between foreign direct investment, exporting or not
servicing the foreign market at all. Firm heterogeneity allows endogenously de-
termining these decisions (as well as those on quantity and prices) as a function
of factor productivity, like in Helpman et al. (2004). If the ￿rm chooses invest-
ment abroad, part of the production remains at the domestic headquarter and
is supplied to the foreign a¢ liate via intra-￿rm trade, like in Grossman & Rossi-
Hansberg (2008). As a consequence, foreign investment may actually be associated
with increased domestic activity and tax payments. In this case, according to the
authors favoring the exemption system, a tax on foreign pro￿ts unnecessarily re-
duces the multinational￿ s ￿rm activity without bene￿tting (or even by harming)
the domestic economy. The model presented in this paper allows asking whether
4Other standard references are Bond & Samuelson (1989) and Bucovetsky & Wilson (1991).
5See e.g. Desai & Hines (2003, 2004), Hines (2008), Desai (2009).
6See e.g. Egger & Pfa⁄ermayr (2003), Simpson (2008), Desai, Foley & Hines (2009) and
Kleinert & Toubal (forthcoming).
2this view is correct and how the choice of the optimal tax rate on foreign pro￿ts
looks like in such a setting.
As the main result, the model shows that, even if foreign investment increases
domestic activity and tax payments, a tax on foreign income is optimal for e¢ -
ciency purposes. It turns out that the standard result proves to be robust in this
setting: The nationally optimal tax system implies full taxation after deduction
of foreign tax payments. The reason is that ￿rms themselves take into account
that domestic pro￿ts increase in response to foreign investment. Without a full
tax on foreign income, social and private interests diverge. Moreover, I ￿nd that,
if the home country is able to manipulate the foreign price level, the incentive
to levy a tax on foreign pro￿ts may even increase.7 From a global point of view
(i.e. accounting for the welfare of the foreign country￿ s household), the tax rate
on foreign pro￿ts is ine¢ ciently high. In contrast to the standard literature, the
globally optimal tax system may imply exemption of foreign income.
In order to set the contribution of this paper in a wider context, it is useful
to consider how the literature on optimal foreign pro￿t taxation evolved after the
seminal achievement by Peggy Musgrave (1963). Essentially, the literature has
dealt with a number of extensions concerning the assumption of a ￿xed capital
stock (Horst, 1980, Keen & Piekkola, 1997), the implementation of double tax-
ation agreements in a strategic multi-country setting (e.g., Janeba, 1995, Mintz
& Tulkens, 1996, and Davies, 2003), the role of deferral (Dharmapala, Foley &
Forbes, 2009) and headquarter mobility (Voget, 2009). Moreover, the implications
of alternative forms of investment like r&d spending (Grubert & Mutti, 1995) and
mergers and acquisitions (Desai & Hines, 2003, 2004, Becker & Fuest, forthcom-
ing) have been considered. For the purpose of this paper, extensions regarding
the multinational ￿rm￿ s investment behaviour and the introduction of a world
capital market are most important. If a country is small relative to the world cap-
ital market, capital is virtually in￿nitely available at a ￿xed interest rate. Then,
investment abroad need not be associated with reduced investment at home, as
both investment levels are e⁄ectively determined by the world market interest
7Accounting for tax e⁄ects on the foreign price level may capture the case in which foreign
and domestic investment are complementary within the ￿rm (as in Desai, Foley & Hines, 2005)
but are substitutes in aggregate (as demonstrated by Feldstein, 1995) because foreign investment
by one ￿rm crowds out activity by other ￿rms.
3rate. In this setting, there is no need to tax foreign income for e¢ ciency reasons
(see Grubert & Mutti, 1995, Mintz & Tulkens, 1996, and Devereux, 2004, for a
discussion).8 However, these studies (implicitly) assume perfect competition and,
thus, miss some features of multinational ￿rm activity which have been stressed
by recent empirical studies.
Given the literature with its broad range of assumption sets and modelling
choices, the question arises which model to choose in order to answer the research
question brought up by the recent debate on switching to the exemption system.
I have two answers to this question. Firstly, the model should capture all the styl-
ized facts which the exemption proponents have indicated to be crucial for their
argument and which the recent empirical studies have proven to be robust. These
are ￿rm heterogeneity, imperfect competition and the simultaneous existence of
exporting and FDI. The model should yield that domestic activity may react pos-
itively to foreign investment within the ￿rm (Desai, Foley & Hines, 2005), and
negatively in aggregate (Feldstein, 1995). Secondly, the proponents of the exemp-
tion system themselves recommend a model framework in the tradition of Melitz
(2003) for deriving optimal tax rates on foreign income: ￿This new evidence (...)
suggests that further explorations of the application of these models to the question
of taxing foreign pro￿ts would be highly pro￿table￿(Desai, 2009, p. 11/12). It
turns out, though, that a Melitz (2003) framework with FDI, as in Helpman et
al. (2004) cannot replicate the stylized fact that domestic activity increases in re-
sponse to foreign investment. Therefore, I adopt model features from Grossman &
Rossi-Hansberg (2008) where the multinational ￿rm is allowed to allocate di⁄erent
production ￿tasks￿across locations within the ￿rm. This gives rise to intra-￿rm
trade and links the two activity levels at home and abroad with each other.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I
present the model and the results for nationally and globally optimal tax policy.
Section 3 discusses potential extensions and limitations of the analysis. Section 4
concludes.
8This is true, as long as the domestic tax rate is assumed to be given and no revenue re-
quirement is binding. If the domestic tax rate is endogenized, the government faces a Ramsey
style problem of optimization where optimal tax rates on domestic and foreign income re￿ ect the
locational elasticities.
42 The model
As indicated above, the model used in this paper has two building blocks, the
￿rst adopted from Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004), the second from from
Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008). The integration of these two model types
becomes necessary because of the tax focus in this paper which will be clari￿ed
later on.
Consider a world with two countries labelled home (h) and foreign (f). In each
of these two countries, there are a representative household and many heterogen-
eous ￿rms.
2.1 Households
The representative consumers in the home and the foreign country derive utility
Uh and Uf, respectively, from a numØraire good y and a variety of di⁄erentiated
goods X. The di⁄erentiated goods are either produced in the home country, then
denoted as xh with index i, or in the foreign country, denoted as xf with index j.
To keep things simple, I assume that the household preferences in both countries
are equal. Therefore, location indices for representative consumers are omitted
until misunderstandings may arise.
The utility function is given by
















where ￿ and ￿ are preference parameter, Nh and Nf are the numbers of home
and foreign produced varieties, respectively, and ￿ > 1. I further assume that
￿￿1
￿ > ￿ which ensures that each ￿rst derivative of (1) with respect to xh (i)
and xf (j) describe a utility maximum (see Chor, 2009, for a similar modelling
strategy).
The budget constraint is given by







5where I denotes the household￿ s after-tax income which is the sum of wage
income, after-tax pro￿ts of ￿rms and lump-sum transfers from the government.
Prices are given by ph, pf and unity for the numØraire good y. I assume that all
home ￿rms belong to the home country￿ s representative household and all foreign
￿rms to the foreign household.
Substituting the budget constraint into the utility function yields






















The pro￿t-maximizing quantities of xh (i) and x(j) can be written as
xh (i) = ph (i)
￿￿ P
￿￿ 1













is the price index.9 It can
be shown that the representative household￿ s utility can be expressed as













where W is the household￿ s wage income, ￿ is dividend income from ￿rms
belonging to the household and T is a lump-sum transfer from the government
￿nanced by source-based business taxes.
2.2 Firms
The numØraire good y is produced by ￿rms in both countries with constant returns
to scale technology under perfect competition. Labor productivity in this sector
is identical in both countries. The numØraire good y can be freely traded across
borders which e⁄ectively equalizes wages in both countries.
Upon entering the market, each home ￿rm draws a productivity level, given
9Note that, due to the quasi-linearity of the utility function, the utility-maximizing quantities
do not depend on the income level. Of course, this is di⁄erent in a world without a numØraire
good, which will be discussed in section 3.
6by 1=a(i), where a(i) is the amount of labor the ￿rm i needs to produce a unit of
x(i) (cf. Helpman et al., 2004). Firms di⁄er in a(i). For simplicity, assume that a
is uniformly distributed over the intervall [a￿;a+] and that a increases in the index
i. Similarly, each foreign ￿rm draws a productivity level a(j). For simplicity, I
assume that the distributions of a(i) and a(j) are independent of each other and
that @a(i)=@i = 1 and @a(j)=@j = 1.
In principle, all ￿rms in the di⁄erentiated goods sector are allowed to serve
both markets. Since both markets are perfectly separated and the paper￿ s focus
is on optimal repatriation taxation by the home country government, I will focus
on the foreign market in what follows.
Home country ￿rms either export their goods to the foreign market (export
regime, denoted by subscript E) or invest in own production facilities in the foreign
country (FDI regime, denoted by subscript I). In the export regime, the goods are
produced in the home country and sold in the foreign country. Production requires
a ￿xed cost of FE units of labor input. Variable costs are the wage rate w (the
index of which has been omitted since wage rates are identical in both locations)
grossed up by the transport cost ￿ > 1. After-tax pro￿ts are then given by
￿E (i) = [(p(i) ￿ a(i)￿w)x(i) ￿ wFE](1 ￿ th) (6)
where th is the corporate tax rate in the home country.
The individual ￿rm chooses x(i) given the choices of all other ￿rms in the
economy. It also assumes that its choice has no impact on the price index Pf.






If the ￿rm decides to invest in foreign production facilities, production is shif-
ted to the foreign country. However, a fraction ￿I 2 [0;1] of production remains
at the headquarter (think of management or technology services; Grossman &
Rossi-Hansberg, 2008, use the term ￿tasks￿that can be allocated across locations
within the ￿rm). For accounting and tax purposes, the foreign a¢ liate has to pur-
chase the part of the goods produced in the home country from the home country
headquarter at a price of ￿. Shifting production abroad may lower the variable pro-
7duction cost, since there is a transport cost related to exporting. However, foreign
direct investment involves a higher ￿xed cost of production, FI > FE. After-tax
pro￿ts are given by
￿I (i) = ￿Ia(i)(￿ ￿ ￿w)x(i)(1 ￿ th)
+[(p(i) ￿ a(i)[(1 ￿ ￿I)w + ￿I￿])x(i) ￿ wFI](1 ￿ te) (8)
where te is the e⁄ective tax rate on foreign income equal to te = tf +tr (1 ￿ tf)
and tr is the statutory tax rate on repatriated foreign pro￿ts. The pro￿t maxim-











If the transfer price exactly re￿ ects the cost of the headquarter input, ￿ = ￿w,
the price pI does not depend on tax rate di⁄erentials between th and te.10 The
reason is that, at ￿ = ￿w, there is no taxable pro￿t at the headquarter location.
Since variable costs are deductible at the foreign a¢ liate and marginal pro￿ts are
zero, the e⁄ective tax on foreign pro￿ts, te, does not play a role either. However,
if ￿ > ￿w, part of the foreign pro￿t is shifted to the home country headquarter
via intra-￿rm trade. If the e⁄ective tax on headquarter income is higher than on
a¢ liate income, th > te, this drives up the variable cost and, thus, the pro￿t-
maximizing price. Put di⁄erently, an increase in the repatriation tax tr reduces
the price:
@pI(i)
@tr = ￿ ￿
￿￿1a(i)￿I (￿ ￿ ￿w)
1￿th
(1￿tf)(1￿tr)2. In the following, I will allow
for cases in which ￿ 6= ￿w and consider ￿ = ￿w as a special case.
Finally, foreign ￿rms have an after-tax pro￿t of
￿f (j) = (1 ￿ tf)[(pf (j) ￿ a(j)w)xf (j) ￿ wFf] (10)





10Of course, the same is true if ￿I = 0, i.e. all production takes place at the foreign a¢ liate
and no intra-￿rm trade occurs.
82.3 Equilibrium
The focus of this paper is on the welfare and e¢ ciency properties of repatriation
taxation. I therefore take the tax rates th and tf as given.11 Consider the following
three decision stages. In the ￿rst stage, the home country sets the tax rate tr on
repatriated foreign income. In the second stage, all ￿rms choose whether or not
to produce and the home country ￿rms choose between the export and the FDI
regime. In the third stage, all producing ￿rms and the representative households
choose their quantities.
The decisions in the third stage are implicitly determined by equations (7), (9)
and (11). The second stage decisions are characterized by three equations which
de￿ne di⁄erent margins. At the ￿rst two margins, the marginal home and foreign
￿rms make zero pro￿ts. Firms with a labor productivity below 1=ac
f and 1=ac
h,
respectively, do not have an incentive to enter the market, where ac
h and ac
f are
de￿ned by ￿h (Nh) = 0 and ￿f (Nf) = 0 and Nh and Nf denote the indices of the
marginal home country and foreign ￿rms, respectively. At the third margin, the
marginal ￿rm is indi⁄erent between exporting and FDI. The threshold level ac
I is
de￿ned by ￿E (nc) = ￿I (nc) where nc is the index of the marginal ￿rm and
￿E (n

























Before I analyze the welfare implications of home country tax policy in the
next subsection, it is worth brie￿ y discussing some speci￿c features of the model
outlined above. Firstly, only the more productive ￿rms, i.e. ￿rms with a labor pro-
ductivity above 1=ac







is demonstrated in the appendix. I only consider cases in which this condition
11This assumption is in line with the standard literature. However, as demonstrated in
Devereux (2000), it is of crucial importance. If tax revenue from foreign income can be used
to reduce domestic taxes (or increase public goods provision), levying taxes on repatriated di-
vidends may yield e¢ ciency gains. In this setting, the government faces a Ramsey style problem
of optimal taxation where optimal tax rates re￿ ect locational elasticities. It should be noted,
though, that apart from extreme situations exemption of foreign income is not a likely outcome
if domestic taxes are endogenized.












1￿￿. Secondly, FDI increases output as long
as pI (i) < pE (i). Thirdly, FDI may cause domestic activity to rise. Here, domestic
activity - measured in labor input - does not decline if ￿Iac
IxI (nc) ￿ ac
IxE (nc)+FE.
Note that, without intra-￿rm trade (￿I = 0), domestic activity would always de-
cline in response to foreign investment which is why the model part adopted from
Grossman & Rossi-Hansberg (2008) is needed.
All these features are backed by empirical evidence. As indicated in the intro-
duction, some authors presume that this changes the conditions for optimal tax
policy substantially. This is to be examined in the next section.
2.4 Welfare
In line with the literature, I assume that the home country government maximizes
the representative consumer￿ s utility Uh which is the sum of wage income, ￿rm
pro￿ts, tax revenue and consumer surplus in the di⁄erentiated goods sector. This
implies that the government has two kinds of incentive to levy a tax, i.e. to redis-
tribute funds from the private to the public sector. Firstly, it may want to change
the ￿rms￿or households￿decisions for allocative e¢ ciency reasons. Secondly, it
may want to extract rents from foreigners. Since the focus of this paper is on
the optimal choice of the repatriation tax levied by the home country which only
concerns home country ￿rms, it is possible to abstract from the second incentive
to levy taxes by assuming that tax rates th and tf are given (which is also in line
with the literature, see Richman, 1963, and the subsequent contributions cited
above).12
Due to the quasi-linearity of the utility function, the household￿ s wage income
and consumer surplus in the home country are not a⁄ected by variations in tr.13
12Another option would be to assume that the households have a preference for a publicly
provided good. However, such an analysis would also require to endogenize the tax rates th and
tr.
13Actually, Desai (2009) claims that a tax on foreign pro￿ts reduces competition in the home
country market (￿Overall welfare is reduced at home given the lowered competition amongst
￿rms￿ , p. 11). This may be true if foreign investment lowers variable cost associated with home
country production, e.g. due to higher r&d activity. These e⁄ects would require another model,
though, and are therefore neglected in the following.
10Firm pro￿ts can be expressed as


























and tax revenue as




































To start I assume that the home country government takes the foreign price
level as given. This assumption will be relaxed in subsection 2.6. The tax rate on
foreign pro￿ts, tr, is optimally chosen if
@Uh
@tr = 0 with
@Uh
@tr





































which equals zero at tr = th. It can be shown that
@2Uh
@t2
r < 0.14 Thus, the
optimal tax system implies full taxation of foreign pro￿ts after deducting foreign
tax payments. This is the standard results ￿rstly derived by Peggy Musgrave in
1963. The novel result here is that even though the foreign investment generates
income and tax revenue in the home country, the home country government has an
incentive to fully tax foreign income after deducting foreign tax payments. Note
that this is even true if the home country tax revenue of the marginal ￿rm is larger
under the FDI regime than under the export regime. Higher domestic tax revenue
14A formal derivation is available upon request.
11(at tr = 0) implies that the foreign part of the ￿rm￿ s tax base is negative.15 Using
￿E (nc) = ￿I (nc), the above equation can be expressed as
@Uh
@tr















(1 ￿ tr)(1 ￿ th)
[￿I (n







where the term in square brackets is the foreign part of the tax base. If it is
negative, the appendix shows that @nc
@tr > 0. Thus, at tr = 0,
@Uh
@tr > 0.
I can therefore state
Proposition 1 If the home country government does not take into account the
e⁄ects of its tax policy on the price level, the optimal tax on foreign pro￿ts is
tr = th (full taxation after deduction).
What is the intuition behind the above proposition? If, at tr = 0, tax revenue in
the home country are lower if the ￿rm chooses FDI (as in the Musgrave model), the
government has an incentive to increase tr to force the marginal ￿rm back into the
export regime. In contrast, if tax revenue is larger than under the export regime
(as suggested by recent empirical evidence), the government has an incentive to
subsidize FDI which can be achieved by increasing tr (recall that the foreign part
of the tax base is then negative). Finally, if tax revenues from the marginal ￿rm
are equal under both regimes, the foreign part of the tax base is zero. Any tax
rate is optimal and increasing tr does not harm the ￿rm or the economy. Thus, in
all these cases the government has an incentive to increase tr until tr = th. Then,
private and social interests are aligned.
The result in Proposition 1 is diametrically opposed to the views expressed by
the exemption proponents. From my point of view, there are two potential sources
of misunderstanding, i.e. reasons which have led to the mistaken presumption
that exemption is the optimal answer to a situation in which domestic activity by
heterogeneous ￿rms increases in response to foreign investment. The ￿rst concerns
15To be precise, the tax base under the FDI regime is larger if
￿Iac







1￿￿ ￿ wFE. With ￿E (nc) = ￿I (nc)
it follows that the foreign part of the ￿rm￿ s tax base has to be negative for the above condition
to be satis￿ed.
12the investment behaviour by ￿rms. It seems that some of the commentators treat
the domestic income increase as an external e⁄ect of foreign investment which the
￿rm does not account for in its investment decision. However, as long as there
no grave principal-agent issues within the ￿rm, the ￿rm will account for it and
invest until the sum of the returns in both locations equals the cost of production.
The second source of misunderstanding might be identi￿ed in the di⁄erentiation of
marginal from intra-marginal ￿rms. Seemingly, some commentators have ￿rms in
mind which generate positive income abroad and at home. However, such a ￿rm is
not at the margin, i.e. will not react to small changes in the tax environment. The
model shows that marginal ￿rms have either positive income at home or abroad,
but not both.
2.5 Optimal repatriation taxes when exporting is prohib-
itively expensive
In the model outlined above, the tax on foreign pro￿ts mainly a⁄ects the margin
where ￿rms choose between exporting and FDI. There may be cases, however, in
which exporting is no option for servicing the foreign market. For instance, if
transport costs are very high, exporting may be prohibitively expensive. In this
case, ￿rms either invest in foreign production facilities or do not supply at all.
In fact, one might argue that this is the case in which the arguments in favor of
exemption (presented in the introduction) actually apply.
In equilibrium, there are two types of ￿rms, home country ￿rms under the
FDI regime and foreign ￿rms, which charge prices of (9) and (11), respectively.
Furthermore, the equilibrium is characterized by two margins de￿ned by ￿I (nc) =
0 and ￿ (Nf) = 0.
The sum of ￿rm pro￿ts and tax revenue is then given by























Again, home country wage income and consumer surplus are not a⁄ected. The
13e⁄ect of a marginal increase in tr on the sum of ￿ and T is given by
@Uh
@tr












































r < 0. I may thus state
Proposition 2 If exporting is prohibitively expensive and the only way to serve
the foreign market is under the FDI regime, the optimal tax system is full taxation
after deduction of foreign tax payments (tr = th).
What is the intuition behind this result? Since ￿I (nc) = 0, a positive home
country tax base requires a negative foreign part of the ￿rm￿ s tax base. Therefore,
an increase in tr increases FDI. The ￿scal cost of subsidizing FDI equals the return,
i.e. higher home country tax revenue, if tr = th. If there is no positive tax revenue
in the home country, e.g. because ￿ = ￿w, the tax on foreign income is irrelevant
because the foreign tax base is zero as well. A tax rate tr > 0 reduces the income of
the intra-marginal ￿rms, but this has no welfare e⁄ect because the ￿rms are owned
by the representative household who also receives the tax revenue as a lump-sum
transfer.
2.6 Optimal repatriation taxes when home country taxes
a⁄ect the foreign price level
So far I assumed that the home country government neglects that its tax policy
a⁄ects the consumer price level in the foreign country. However, the government
may take into account that an increase in FDI and a resulting drop in the foreign
price level deteriorates the pro￿ts of other ￿rms supplying in this market. This
introduces a strategic aspect into the analysis which has, in the context of the
model, two dimensions. Firstly, since an increase in home country ￿rms￿quantities
14reduces the market shares of foreign ￿rms, tax policy might be used to extract
rents from foreign monopolists, like in Brander & Spencer (1985) and Eaton &
Grossman (1986). Secondly, accounting for the price level widens the perspective
to the aggregate level. As mentioned above, empirical analysis ￿nds that, whereas
foreign investment is associated with increased domestic investment within the
￿rm (Desai, Foley & Hines, 2005), on the aggregate level, an increase in foreign
investment crowds out domestic investment nearly dollar for dollar (Feldstein,
1995). Policy-makers might have the incentive to account for this e⁄ect on other
domestic ￿rms when deciding on tax policy strategies.
How does optimal tax policy look like when the government takes into account
price level e⁄ects of its tax revenue? The e⁄ect of a small increase in tr on the





































The ￿rst term on the right hand side captures the direct e⁄ect of tr on prices
pI (i). The second term represents the price level e⁄ect of a tax induced change at
the export-FDI-margin. The third and fourth terms are the changes at the market
entry margin of home and foreign ￿rms, respectively.
The appendix demonstrates that
dPf
dtr is ambiguous. This is because two coun-
tervailing e⁄ects are at work. Given that an increase in tr reduces FDI and
pE (nc) > pI (nc), this has - ceteris paribus - a positive e⁄ect on the price level.
However, an increase in tr also reduces the prices of all intra-marginal ￿rms under
the FDI regime (as long as ￿ > ￿w). This has - ceteris paribus - a negative e⁄ect
on the price level. It can be shown that for small ￿ approaching the headquarter
variable cost ￿w, the e⁄ect of a tax increase is positive:
dPf
dtr > 0.
















































@Pf > 0, it follows that, for tr = th, an increase in tr still increases
welfare if
@Pf
@tr > 0 and vice versa. I can therefore state
Proposition 3 If an increase in tr increases the price level Pf,
@Pf
@tr > 0, the
optimal tax rate on foreign pro￿ts tr exceeds the tax rate under full taxation after
deduction, i.e. tr > th.
What is the intuition behind this e⁄ect? An increase in tr reduces the number
of ￿rms under the FDI regime. The marginal ￿rm is just indi⁄erent between
FDI and exporting. However, all ￿rms pro￿t from an increase in the price level.
As a consequence, the sum of ￿rm pro￿ts and tax revenue increases. Seen from a
di⁄erent perspective, the tax internalizes an external e⁄ect which the ￿rm investing
in FDI does not take into account. By having lower variable cost, the price level
is reduced which then translates into lower pro￿ts for all other ￿rms. Forcing
the ￿rm back into exporting thus corrects for this (from a national perspective)
ine¢ ciently high level of FDI.
The results for the case in which exporting is prohibitively expensive are similar.
An increase in tr reduces all prices and therefore decreases the price level. The
e⁄ects on the marginal ￿rm are therefore ambiguous: its own pro￿ts under FDI are
increased for a given price level, but the price level itself is larger and, therefore,
pro￿ts are - ceteris paribus - lower. An important di⁄erence is, though, that if
￿ = ￿w the tax rate tr does not a⁄ect neither nc nor Pf. The reason is that
￿ (nc) = 0 and @pI (i)=@tr = 0 in this case.
162.7 Global optimality
By assumption, the nationally optimal tax policy by the home country does not
take into account the foreign household￿ s utility Uf. Again, it is worthwhile to
recall that, in the Musgrave model, the nationally optimal tax policy (full taxation
after deduction) implies ine¢ ciently high tax rates from a global point of view.
The reason is that the home government considers foreign taxes as costs although,
from a global viewpoint, taxes are just funds redistributed from the private to the
public sector. What are the e¢ ciency features of nationally optimal tax policy in
our model?
Global welfare is simply the sum of home country and foreign welfare. The













surplus. Foreign pro￿ts ￿f are given by


















































The question arises how tr a⁄ects the foreign household￿ s utility. Global welfare





































@tr > 0, a reduction of tr starting from tr = th unambiguously
increases global welfare. The optimal tax system implies te < th.
Proof. See appendix.
17The intuition behind this proposition is the following. An increase in tr if
optimally chosen by the home country government does not a⁄ect home country
welfare. From the viewpoint of the foreign country, it increases the price level,
reduces the number of home country ￿rms in the foreign country and increases
entry of foreign ￿rms into the market. It can be shown that, ￿rstly, an increasing
price level reduces consumer surplus more than it increases ￿rm pro￿ts and tax
revenue and, secondly, that the loss in welfare due to a reduction of home country
￿rms￿FDI dominates the welfare gain due to increased market entry.
The above proposition has three important implications. Firstly, the tax credit
system is not a globally optimal tax policy choice. Secondly, it cannot be excluded
that the exemption system is globally optimal. At te = th, (credit system), it is
still desirable to reduce the tax in order to increase consumer surplus. Thirdly,
since the tax credit system replicates the allocation, prices and quantities in the
absence of taxes, the above proposition implies that a globally optimal tax system
with te < th attains a higher global welfare level than in the absence of taxation.
The reason is that the market is characterized by imperfect competition. There is
too little FDI in the absence of taxation since ￿rms do not account for the resulting
decrease in consumer prices.
3 Extensions and discussion
In this section, I discuss some crucial issues related to the model presented above
and compare the model results to those in the standard literature. Crucial mod-
elling issues concern the transfer price ￿ (3.1), implications for the labor market
(3.2) and modelling choices with respect to taxation (3.3). Linkages to the existing
literature are discussed in section 3.4.
The choice of the transfer price ￿: So far, the transfer price ￿ has been
treated as an exogenous variable. This may be questioned for two reasons. Firstly,
it is often assumed in the literature that ￿rms have some discretion in manipulating
transfer prices for tax saving purposes. Firms would have an incentive to charge
the lowest possible transfer prices as long as te < th. A natural lower bound of
transfer prices might be the variable headquarter cost ￿wh. However, at te > th,
18this behaviour is reversed. While endogenizing the transfer price is clearly beyond
the scope of this paper, it should be noted that the results do not crucially depend
on the actual level of ￿. Secondly, in bilateral tax agreements, national governments
often agree on some system of transfer price rules that e⁄ectively split the tax base
according to some notion of fairness. It is an interesting question how transfer
pricing rules can be used to align the incentives for the two national governments
involved given the investment behaviour of multinational ￿rms. This is, however,
beyond the scope of this paper.
Labor market e⁄ects: In the model presented above, it is possible to abstract
from labor market e⁄ects of tax policy choices due to the assumptions of a quasi-
linear utility function and the existence of a numØraire good. Assuming quasi-
linearity of the utility function greatly simpli￿es the analysis but, of course, also
restricts the model results in their generality. Without a numØraire good which
enters linearly into the utility function, wages would adjust to tax rate changes.
Similarly, the labor market would play an important role if labor was not mobile
across the x and the y sector, if unions increase the wage in the x sector or if
labor is taxed di⁄erently across sectors. While the precise welfare e⁄ects of labor
market adjustments due to taxation crucially depends on how the labor market
and its frictions are modelled, it is nevertheless possible to give an intuition what
the e⁄ects look like.
Consider therefore the tax e⁄ects on labor demand in the home country. Let









































Furthermore, it is a priori possible that the marginal ￿rm extends its home country
activity in response to foreign investment: ￿IxI (nc) > xE (nc). Thus, the overall
19e⁄ect of an increase in tr on labor demand is ambiguous. Endogenous wages might
therefore serve as an argument in favor of and against levying positive taxes on
foreign pro￿ts. However, it seems that the arguments against taxing foreign income
are not based on subtle general equilibrium wage e⁄ects which suggests sticking
to the simpler model version with a numØraire good.
Modelling taxes: A third issue worth discussing is the choice of how to model
taxes in a trade model with heterogeneous ￿rms and monopolistic competition
and the question of deductibility. In line with the literature on heterogeneous
multinational ￿rms, see e.g. Melitz (2003), I assumed that variable costs are labor
costs and thus deductible. With certain transfer prices, ￿ = ￿w, corporate taxes
do not distort the pro￿t-maximizing quantity choices. They only distort the choice
between the export and the FDI regime. This would be di⁄erent, if it was assumed
that (part of) the variable cost is capital expenditures. Then, an increase in the
repatriation tax tr would - ceteris paribus - increase the variable cost of all intra-
marginal ￿rms which would give rise to new complexities. For instance, market
entry of marginal exporting ￿rms would have a positive welfare e⁄ect.
It is therefore important to note that the above derived results refers to repat-
riation taxes on foreign pro￿ts and not on foreign production inputs. I leave the
integration of input taxes and the resulting complexities to further research.
Links to the literature: The results derived above show that some of the
classical results in the tradition of Peggy Musgrave remain robust against the
introduction of ￿rm heterogeneity, imperfect competition and intra-￿rm trade.
They are not a trivial replication of the standard theory, though. It is worth
discussing what the framework presented here has in common with the classical
one and where are the crucial di⁄erences.
The most important di⁄erence concerns the question how domestic and foreign
activity are related. In the Musgrave framework, savings are distributed across
locations. A dollar invested abroad cannot be invested at home - investment
projects in both locations are therefore substitutes. In contrast, in the above
presented framework an increase in activity abroad (FDI) does not necessarily
reduce activity at home. One of the main insights of this paper is, that the
20desirability of taxing foreign income does not depend on the e⁄ects of foreign
activity on domestic activity (e.g. measured by tax revenue).
Moreover, capital productivity in the Musgrave framework entirely depends on
the location. A dollar of additional investment reduces the marginal productivity
of capital in a given location and vice versa. In the framework presented here pro-
ductivity is ￿rm-speci￿c. Furthermore, the Musgrave model assumes homogeneous
￿rms whereas the framework considered here explicitly allows for ￿rm heterogen-
ity. This allows determining endogenously which ￿rms produce, which ones export
and which ones invest in foreign production facilities. Finally, this paper explicitly
allows for imperfect competition. This di⁄erence to the classical framework is im-
portant because a tax on foreign pro￿ts is sometimes interpreted in the context of
strategic trade policy since, under imperfect competition, national ￿rms may ex-
tract rents from foreign markets and thus hurt their competitors.16 As this paper
demonstrates, a tax on foreign pro￿ts is nevertheless optimal. Imperfect competi-
tion is also the reason that the global optimality of the tax credit system does not
hold anymore. As it is shown above, proponents of the exemption system should
argue more with the notion of global optimality than with the national interest.
4 Conclusion
One of the recently promoted arguments in favor of the exemption system goes
as follows: If foreign investment does not a⁄ect or even fosters domestic activity,
taxing foreign income is no longer desirable. In this paper, I build a model with
heterogeneous ￿rms and intra-￿rm trade and derive the choice of the optimal tax
rate on foreign pro￿ts. It turns out that, even though foreign investment may be
associated with increased domestic investment and higher domestic tax revenues,
the optimal tax system implies full taxation of foreign income after deducting
foreign tax payments. Thus, exemption is not an optimal choice from the national
point of view. The standard view on foreign pro￿t taxation prevails. However, the
globally optimal tax rate is lower than the one chosen under a tax credit system
(which has been considered globally optimal in the standard model). This may
16In the context of monopolistic competition, negative external e⁄ects of increasing quantities
on other ￿rms￿pro￿t levels occur because the price level is a⁄ected.
21imply, under certain circumstances, that exemption is optimal from a global point
of view.
Of course, the model results should be seen in the light of the many restrictions
due to the speci￿city of the model assumption. As the literature cited in the
introduction shows, a change in assumption is likely to translate into a change in
the recommendation for optimal tax policy. In fact, policy-makers are aware of
this conditionality; for instance, a US Treasury report states that ￿[n]one of the
proposed standards [of international taxation] ￿ts all cases and tax policy cannot
feasibly be calibrated to have di⁄erent rules for di⁄erent cases￿ (United States
Department of the Treasury, O¢ ce of Tax Policy, 2007).17 It should therefore be
recalled that the purpose of this paper is to analyze speci￿c arguments based on
the empirical ￿nding that foreign investment need not be associated with reduced
domestic activity. The paper￿ s aim is to check whether tax exemption is an optimal
tax policy response in this economic environment. It turns out that in such a
situation exempting foreign income from tax is not an optimal strategy although
there may be other good arguments in favor of doing so.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Productive ￿rms choose FDI
This appendix derives the conditions under which the more productive ￿rms choose
the FDI regime and the less productive ￿rms prefer exporting. A ￿rm is indi⁄erent








a(i) , an increase in nc has the following impact
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What is the e⁄ect of a small increase in tr on the export-FDI-margin, i.e.







@nc > 0 is derived
above.
@[￿E(nc)￿￿I(nc)]
@(1￿tr) is given by




















@nc is negative if
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0 which is the case if
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This equation can be expressed as





I [(1 ￿ ￿I)w + ￿I￿])x(n
c) ￿ wFI](1 ￿ tf)
It follows that
@[￿E(nc)￿￿I(nc)]
@tr > 0 as long as the foreign part of the ￿rm￿ s tax
base is positive.
Appendix 2: Accounting for changes in the price level
In this appendix, I derive the e⁄ect of a small increase in tr on the endogenous
variables that characterize the equilibrium accounting for e⁄ects on the foreign
price level Pf. The export-FDI-margin is characterized by ￿E (nc) = ￿I (nc), the
entry margin for home country ￿rms by ￿E (Nh) = 0, the entry margin for foreign
















These four equations de￿ne the endogenous variables nc, Nh, Nf and Pf. The
total di⁄erential is given by
n
c :
@ (￿E (nc) ￿ ￿I (nc))
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It can be shown that, if ￿ = wh, dnc
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Appendix 3: Global optimality
In this appendix, I derive the ￿rst-order condition of tr for global welfare. Adding
home country pro￿ts in (14), home country tax revenue in (15), foreign pro￿ts in
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which can be simpli￿ed, using
@pI(i)
@tr = ￿ ￿

















































@tr > 0, the consumer surplus decreases more than ￿rm pro￿ts
are increased (￿rst term). The ￿rst term in square brackets which captures the
e⁄ect of the marginal ￿rm￿ s regime switch on global tax revenue is unambiguously
positive. The second term in square brackets depicts the e⁄ect of the intra-marginal
￿rms￿price changes on global tax revenue which is positive, too. Thus, the sign
of the whole term depends on the sign of th ￿ te.
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